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Abstract 
When New Public Management (NPM) reforms are introduced in various countries, 
one central element in the balance between political control and institutional and 
professional autonomy is the development of new performance management systems. 
One such system is Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR), based on an 
official OECD model. It presupposes that public goals are unambiguous, instruments 
easy to define, results easy to measure and report, and incentives easy to establish. Our 
thesis, however, is that modern management systems of this kind are neither neutral nor 
objective, but rather complex and discretionary structures embedded in a political–
institutional context. To analyze how MBOR-type systems work in practice, we focus 
on a recent reform of the hospital structure in Norway. We analyze two types of reform 
effects: one connected with how regional and local executives in the new hospital 
system have experienced the effects and implications of the reform and how the effects 
varies by trust based and performance based management models. The other 
concerning the problems and dysfunction of the Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) 
system in hospitals. Using a broad institutional perspective we show that the MBOR-
system in Norway is in reality a mixed and complex system encompassing different 
kinds of logic. These include instrumental elements from the new performance-
management systems combined with ad hoc preventive efforts by the political 
leadership, the influence of cultural path-dependency, elements of rather inappropriate 
self-interested action, and pressure from the environment. 
Sammendrag 
Når New Public Management inspirerte reformer innføres i ulike land, er utvikling av 
mål- og resultatstyringseknikker et viktig element for å ivareta balansen mellom politisk 
styring og institusjonell og profesjonell autonomi. Mål- og resultastyring bygger på 
forutsetninger om at målene er utvetydige, at det er lett å formulere virkemidler, å måle 
og rapportere resultater og å utvikle velfungerende incentivsystemer. Vår tese er 
imidlertid at moderne resultatstyringsteknikker av denne typen verken er nøytrale eller 
objektive, men heller temmelige komplekse strukturer som åpner for store 
skjønnsmessige vurderinger og som er vevd inn i en politisk–institusjonell kontekst. For 
å analysere hvordan mål- og resultatstryingsteknikker fungerer i praksis, har vi fokusert 
på sykehusreformen i Norge. Vi undersøker to ulike sider ved reformen. For det første 
hvordan ledere i lokale og regionale helseforetak vurderer ulike effekter og implikasjoner 
av reformen og hvordan dette varierer med tillitsbaserte og resultatbaserte 
styringsmodeller. For det andre hvordan det innsatsrelaterte DRG-baserte finansierings-
systemet i sykehusene fungerer i praksis gjennom fokus på problemer og dysfunksjoner 
som kan oppstå. Ved hjelp av et bredt institusjonelt perspektiv viser vi hvordan mål- og 
resulttstyringsteknikker innenfor sykehusvesnet i realiteten er et blandet og komplekst 
system som er baert på ulike logikker. Disse omfatter instrumeltelle elementer fra NPM 
systemene kombinert med ad hoc inngrep fra politisk lederskap, betydningen av 
adminsitrative kulturer, tradisjoner og tillitssrelasjoner, elementer av upassende 
handlinger basert på egeninteresse og omgivelsdespress.  
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Introduction 
When New Public Management-oriented reforms are implemented in public 
organizations there are different ways to assess the effects of these reforms. One, rather 
broad approach is to look at whether the reforms have changed the decision-making 
behaviour of central political and administrative actors or their role enactment in general 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Often the focus in such 
studies is on whether reforms have resulted in changed patterns of influence and on 
how they have affected political control and democracy. A second, narrower approach is 
to examine the functioning of new management systems connected to NPM. One such 
central system is Management by Objectives and Results (MBOR). This is a 
performance–management tool encompassing three main components. First, the 
leadership must formulate clear, stable and consistent goals and targets and give 
subordinate bodies more leeway and discretion in their daily work. Second, subordinate 
agencies and units must report on performance and results using a well-developed 
system of performance indicators. Finally, the leadership must use the reported results 
to reward good performance and punish bad. The main hypothesis here is that this 
model will enhance efficiency without having a negative effect on other goals and values 
(Pollitt et al. 2004).  
This paper will focus on a performance–management system of this kind. While 
MBOR systems may be seen as based on technical and objective evidence, our angle is 
that they are characterized by political processes (Aucoin and Jarvis 2004). There are 
some major reasons for this. One is that there are differences between the ideals and 
theories informing such systems and how they work in reality, i.e. it is difficult to fulfil 
the system’s goals or intentions. Public goals are often broad and vague «mission 
statements» (Boyne 2003: 213), providing scope for ambiguity. Public managers have 
«room for interpretation», and strict business measurement methods are difficult to use 
(Noordegraaf and Abma 2003). This is related to the second feature, namely, that 
performance–management systems are embedded in a political–administrative context, 
where decisions taken and their practical implementation stem from a complex 
combination of environmental factors, cultural traditions and diverse, organizationally 
based interests furthered by those organizations’ actors (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
Measuring performance is a politically complex task, and the search for a single best 
performance measure is thus a futile one. What is more, measuring performance may 
shape behaviour in both desirable and undesirable ways (Behn 2003). 
We will analyze how the MBOR system works in practice by focusing on the case of 
Norway, where this system is now widely used in the public sector (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2002). More specifically, we will address how performance–management 
systems work by examining the management of the hospital system. The traditional 
Norwegian health care system has been characterized as a single-payer decentralized 
model (Byrkjeflot 2004, Kokko et al. 1998). This model has been challenged by 
comprehensive reforms over the past 10 years. In this paper we will focus on two such 
reforms. We start by focusing on the Norwegian Hospital Reform, prescribed by the 
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new Health Enterprise Act, which came into force in 2002. The reform set up new 
management principles for hospitals, based on a decentralized enterprise model. A main 
tool for regulating relations between central control and local autonomy is the 
performance–management system. One part of this system is the establishment of a 
quasi-contractual steering model, whereby the ministry allocates resources and specifies 
targets and goals for the various regional health enterprises by means of an annual 
steering document. The enterprises, in turn, are expected to report on performance 
through formal reports and a formalised steering dialogue (Opedal and Stigen et al. 2002 
and 2003). 
We will also examine the part of the hospital performance system that is integrated 
into financial management systems. Norwegian health enterprises are financed partly by 
funding or reimbursement from the government based on productivity. Performance-
based funding of this kind – a sort of «money-follows-the-patient system» – was 
introduced in 1997. In addition, a sophisticated DRG (Diagnosis Related Groups 
Classification) system was established connected to this financial performance system. 
DRG is an activity-based funding system, whereby doctors code each patient’s case 
according to a complicated typology of diagnoses. In theory, the severer the diagnosis, 
the greater the resources needed, and hence the more the hospital is reimbursed.  
In this paper we will first present a theoretical perspective based on a broad 
institutional approach anchored in March and Olsen’s (1989) institutionalism as well as 
in the agency literature (Pollitt et al. 2004). This approach will be contrasted with the 
official or practitioner model of performance management, which proceeds much more 
from the premise that performance–management systems are technical and objective. 
Second, we will introduce the Norwegian context by outlining the hospital reform and 
the activity-based funding system. Third, we will examine how the new performance-
based management system works in practice. We will analyse to what degree the effects 
and results – internal and external – of the reform vary according to how the contract-
steering model is shaped, or whether other factors like trust and cooperation are more 
important. Fourth, the activity-based financing system will be examined by focusing on 
individual cases. Finally, we will discuss our findings with reference to our theoretical 
approach. 
The empirical basis of the paper is first, a mail survey of executive leaders and leader 
teams and all members of the executive boards of the 5 regional and 35 local health 
enterprises conducted in 2003. A total of 326 respondents answered the questionnaires 
and the response rate was 72 per cent (Opedal and Stigen et al. 2003). This group of 
respondents will have had first-hand experience of the reforms’ effects on the working 
of the performance–management system, but will have less idea of the overall effects as 
seen from the perspective of the political executives and administrative leaders as well as 
by the clinics within the different hospitals. Second, the case studies of the DRG system 
are based on public documents from the government and the Audit Office, on press 
releases issued by the parliament (Storting), the Ministry of Health and the health 
enterprises, and on information from their web sites and media coverage in national and 
regional newspapers. There is also a body of secondary literature from various research 
projects that have studied both this case and other similar systems. 
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Theoretical perspectives 
The introduction of NPM in many countries has been characterized by changes in the 
structure of their political–administrative systems from integrated to disintegrated or 
fragmented systems (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). This has been achieved by 
combining vertical structural specialization – more autonomy for general agencies, 
regulatory agencies and state-owned companies or enterprises – and increased 
horizontal specialization (single- purpose organizations) – differentiating between the 
government’s roles and functions as owner, administrator, regulator, controller, 
purchaser and provider. 
Closely connected with the NPM movement is the Regulatory Reform Program 
launched by the OECD in 1997, which is known as the practitioner’s model (Pollitt et 
al. 2004). The new orthodoxy promoted by the OECD is to separate the regulatory role 
of the state from its roles as owner, policy-maker and commercial actor, to upgrade the 
status of competition to that of a major instrument, to deregulate and liberalize state 
monopolies, to reduce state ownership, to commercialise public services by introducing 
internal markets and quasi markets, to improve performance and efficiency and to make 
public spending more effective.  
The OECD report on Norway focused on hospitals as a key sector. The hospital 
reform was seen as a significant step forward in the promotion of more patient choice 
and greater efficiency and as an important reform aimed at improving hospital 
management. However, it was criticized for not going far enough in promoting market 
mechanisms and for not doing enough to separate the state’s roles as purchaser and 
provider (OECD 2003: 9). A key challenge is considered to be finding the right balance 
between local autonomy and central government control, or, put differently, to fulfil the 
government goal of «centralization of policy and decentralization of delivery 
responsibility».  
The expectation engendered by this official model (Pollitt et al. 2004) or the «public 
interest perspective» (James 2003) is that structural devolution and more managerial 
autonomy combined with performance management will improve performance and 
efficiency without having negative side-effects on other values like control and 
democracy. Our argument is that this is a hypothesis and not an evidence-based fact and 
therefore needs to be examined through empirical studies (Christensen and Lægreid 
2004b). 
 One potential problem is that political executives will lose control and that it will be 
difficult to maintain trust. Aggregative processes and institutions may push aside 
integrative ones, to use March and Olsen’s (1989) concept. Overall these changes seem 
to have resulted in political executives’ losing political control and in administrative 
leaders, agency leaders and state commercial leaders gaining influence (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000). This has prompted efforts by political executives to regain control, i.e., 
deregulation and increased autonomy for subordinate units has been followed by 
attempts to introduce more central control and reregulation, in an attempt to reduce 
ambiguity about when political executives may intervene and to develop a variety of 
performance–management systems (Christensen and Lægreid 2004c, Gregory 2003).  
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Obviously, there is a dynamic interplay between increasing autonomy for agencies 
and state commercial entities and the political–administrative control of those units. In 
prescribing both enhanced autonomy and more control and re-regulation, NPM reforms 
perpetuate an enduring tension and conflict. On the one hand, subordinate 
organizational units are to gain more autonomy, both from the political leadership and 
from other actors. On the other hand, central political control is to be enhanced by 
strengthening frame-steering and regulatory power. Political authorities are to abstain 
from involvement in individual cases while at the same time strengthening their role as 
general regulators through the formulation of laws and rules or by the use of other 
general control instruments. In practice, however, this is not easy, because political 
executives are constantly confronted by individual cases, often of a problematic nature, 
leading to controversial attempts to intervene and also to the development of 
performance–management systems that may potentially give them more control. Often 
political executives operate according to a reactive political logic that may be at odds 
with administrative–economic logic and technical systems (Christensen and Lægreid 
2002). One problem for performance–management systems is that they potentially allow 
the involved parties to «cheat» (Hood 2002). 
The dynamics and tensions indicated reflect the fact that the NPM movement 
generally and the performance management system specifically are double-edged swords 
or hybrids that assume both autonomy and control. On the one hand, they are based on 
economic organization theories, like public choice or principal–agent models, which are 
based on the assumption of distrust (Boston et al. 1996). Agencies and state commercial 
units are assumed to be self-interested bodies that need to be controlled through 
specified performance contracts, performance control and assessments. Thus there is an 
element of centralization and the slogan is «make the managers manage».  
At the same, the NPM movement is also derived from management theories whose 
basic assumption is mutual trust. According to these theories, subordinate units and 
superior bodies have common interests and the only way to increase the efficiency of 
public bodies is to give operating managers more discretion and leeway in deciding how 
to use allocated resources. The best way to improve organizations is supposedly to allow 
more autonomy and flexibility. Thus there is an element of decentralization and the 
slogan is «let the managers manage».  
One of the main doctrines of NPM is managerial discretion combined with 
transparent targets and ex-post control by result or performance (Hood and Bevan 
2004). In setting targets, evaluating output information and applying rewards and 
sanctions it represents a specific type of regulatory system. Performance management 
allows a lot of autonomy and flexibility in the use of allocated resources and in choosing 
the means and measures. However, the price public bodies have to pay for their 
increased freedom is to accept a more rigid performance–management system, which 
includes performance indicators and performance monitoring and assessment. The 
system is thus a mixed one that prescribes both centralization and decentralization and it 
is an empirical question in which direction it will tend in practice.  
In this paper we set out to challenge the official practitioner model by applying a 
broader theoretical approach derived from the work of Pollitt et al. (2004). It is a 
combination of conventional organizational research and neo-institutionalism and uses a 
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broad institutional perspective (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). According to this 
approach, changes and reforms are both encouraged and discouraged by institutions 
(March and Olsen 1989, Brunsson and Olsen 1993). There is an interplay between 
institutional and historical links, conscious and planned reform initiatives, negotiations 
among different actors, and adjustment to external forces. Three dimensions are 
essential in this approach. First, the logic of appropriateness is a dominant logic of 
action (March 1994). Second, goal formulation is often an endogenous process. Third, 
history is not efficient, and path-dependency and traditions may prevent or modify 
reform efforts (March and Olsen 1989). The development of performance management 
will be examined and interpreted in terms of context. Both the historical–institutional 
context of national style of governance and the style of institutional regulation, based on 
specific identities, histories and dynamics, will be studied (Olsen 1997). The challenge is 
to describe and provide a better understanding of the dynamic balance between the 
institutional spheres of the market, professional expertise, autonomous subordinate 
units, and political and administrative executive actors in the field of hospital reform. 
Owing to the intensification of the reform process over the past few years, there is a 
need for a more detailed empirical scrutiny of how reforms are implemented and what 
effects and implications they have. While certain effects are expected and often 
promised, they are seldom reliably documented (Christensen, Lægreid and Wise 2003, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). We operate with an extended effect concept, which not 
only focuses on internal administrative and technical–economic effects but also includes 
external political effects (Olsen 1996). Thus performance management will be studied in 
a wider democratic context. 
The case of Norway 
The context  
The hospital reform and performance management. In 2002 responsibility for Norwegian 
hospitals was transferred from the counties to central government. Ownership was 
thereby centralized to a single body – the Ministry of Health – and an ownership 
department was established to perform this function; administrative and oversight 
functions were organized in two subordinate agencies. The reform also set up new 
management principles for the hospitals based on a decentralized enterprise model. The 
reform thus implied centralization, decentralization and commercialization at the same 
time (Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2003).  
The reform was prepared in a closed and rapid decision-making process and the 
underlying organizational thinking was rather ambiguous and not very well developed 
(Herfindal 2004). One of the main challenges of the reform is to balance the autonomy 
of regional and local health enterprises and political control by the central government. 
On the one hand, the minister of health has full responsibility for conditions in the 
health sector. On the other hand, the enterprises are given enhanced local autonomy, 
with their own executive boards and general managers. The latter have powers of 
authority to set priorities and manage regional and local health enterprises within a 
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certain framework. The reform potentially strengthens overall central government 
ownership responsibilities and control, but it also simultaneously represents a 
decentralized system of management. Thus, it is a rather tension-ridden reform that 
allows for a variety of practices. 
The hospitals changed their organizational form from that of public administration 
entities to become part of regional health enterprises (RHE). Five regional health 
enterprises with separate professional boards were established under the Ministry of 
Health, and these, in turn, organized approximately 250 institutions (mostly hospitals) 
into 35 local health enterprises (LHE) under regional jurisdiction. The health enterprises 
are separate legal entities and are thus not an integral part of the central government 
administration. Fundamental health laws and regulations, policy objectives and 
frameworks are, however, determined by the central government and form the basis for 
the management of the enterprises. Moreover, the organization of the enterprises 
stipulates in several ways how the owner may exercise control. These are some of the 
main features of an MBOR-type performance–management system.  
First, central government appoints the regional board members, none of whom are 
politicians. The only group that has any formal representation is health enterprise 
employees and preference is given to so-called professional board members with 
experience from executive boards in the private sector. Second, the owner exercises 
control through the Health Enterprise Act, through the articles of association, steering 
documents (contracts), and through decisions adopted at the annual enterprise meeting. 
The ministry has attempted to separate the formal steering dialogue (the «line dialogue») 
from the more informal arenas of discussion (the «staff dialogue»). Third, the 
government finances most hospital activities and there is also a formal assessment and 
monitoring system – with formal reports on finance and activities to the ministry.  
In summary the reform provides for decentralized management and delegation of 
financial responsibility while at the same time allowing the minister of health to instruct 
the regional health authorities and overturn board decisions in all cases (cf. OECD 
2003). Consequently, the reform by opening up for stronger state direction and initiative 
appears to represent a break with the stated goals of greater autonomy and delegation 
under the modernization program for the public sector (Byrkjeflot and Neby 2004, 
Grønlie 2004, Lægreid, Stigen and Opedal 2004). A key challenge is how to balance the 
autonomization of the management process and delivery responsibility with the 
centralization of control and policy issues. We believe the reform contains potential 
inconsistencies – a tension between centralizing and decentralizing and between 
economic and management ideas (Boston et al. 1996). The potential deviation between 
theory – representing an official practitioner model – and practice in the new system is 
not only connected to the larger question of how to balance political control and 
enterprise autonomy but also to the influence of the political–institutional context on 
the more specific working of performance–management systems. How easy is it to 
develop performance indicators that are specific and easily measurable? How much 
discretion and qualitative judgment is involved and how do environmental, cultural and 
instrumental factors interact in reality in the working of such systems? Has the system in 
practice turned into a formal performance–management model or is it a combination of 
a trust-based system based on dialogue and a formal contract system?  
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We will also ask whether there are differences between the local and regional levels. 
One argument is that the performance–management system works better the further it 
is removed from the political level. Owing to differences between political logic and 
management logic, the main problem with the performance–management system seems 
to be at the interface between politicians and managers (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). 
Thus we would expect the performance–management system to work better for local 
health enterprises than for regional health enterprises, which are closer to the political 
level. A counter-argument is that proximity to the political level would make executives 
in the regional health enterprises more loyal to the performance–management system. 
The government appoints the board members at the regional level and many of them 
have experience from the private sector and are thus more dedicated to the system. At 
the local level there might be a more explicit mix of traditional, trust-based governance 
and the new steering techniques. There may also, however, be less loyalty to the system 
and it may be more vulnerable to cheating. This leads us to the next point.  
The DRG system and activity-based funding. Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) is a 
classification system that groups in-patients by principal diagnosis and other features in 
order to obtain homogenous resource groups. Resource consumption is calculated for 
each DRG group, reflecting the average cost of treatment in that group. In Norway 
DRG has mainly been used for resource allocation and is now integrated into an 
activity-based funding system. Funding of in-patients’ treatment is linked to activity 
level, calculated as DRG score per hospital stay, reflecting differences in the estimated 
resource consumption between patient groups (Modell 2004). Each group of DRGs has 
an estimated price based on average resources used for a hospital stay for patients in this 
group (Lian 2003).  
The DRG system was first introduced in the USA as a research project in the 1970s 
and applied by the US health insurance fund Medicare from the 1980s onwards. The 
DRG ideas came to Norway in the mid-1980s (Aas 1985, Torjesen 2004) and 
experiments with resource allocation based on DRGs started in the early 1990s. Despite 
considerable implementation problems and no clear efficiency gains (Mellemvik and 
Pettersen 1998, Pettersen 1999, Lian 2003), nation-wide activity-based funding of 
somatic hospitals based on the DRG system was introduced in 1997. Since then DRG-
based performance indicators have been used by central government to allocate 
resources to health enterprises. In recent years, between 30 and 60 per cent of total 
funding has been based on such indicators. 
The main intention behind the use of DRG in Norway was to increase hospitals’ 
level of activity and not to cut total expenditure in the health care sector. The DRG 
system is integrated into an activity-based funding system and works as a management 
tool used in contracts between regional health enterprises and hospitals, as a means of 
introducing performance targets in hospitals and as an incentive for increased 
productivity. Activity-based funding systems have been used to a lesser degree in clinics 
(Kjekshus 2003). This may, however, change as a result of the introduction of value-
based management, unitary management models and the transformation of hospitals 
into health enterprises (Torjesen 2004, Torjesen and Gammelsæter 2004). 
On the surface, DRG seems to be a technical–economic system with efficiency 
potential. However, if one regards such a system not as fair and unbiased, but as built 
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on complexity and professional discretion, then a potential exists for the development 
of intricate strategies to obtain more money from the government. In fact, it is a partly 
discretionary system that allows latitude for different rational strategies between levels 
and actors, and special arrangements have been introduced to avoid negative side-
effects, such as methods for controlling «DRG-creep» or cheating on the system (Lian 
2003).  
One reason for this potential loose coupling of ideals and practice is that it is rather 
difficult to create a fair system in which resources used and reimbursed are exactly 
proportionate. This might lead to the most «valuable» patients being more sought after 
than those who represent a financial «burden». Another reason is that it is left to the 
doctors’ discretion to decide what diagnosis – one with higher, medium or lower 
rewards – to make. Although there are professional norms of appropriateness that 
prevent constant abuse of such a system, it still offers a lot of leeway. Third, patients 
may have multiple problems, and it is then left to doctors’ professional judgement to 
rank main and secondary diagnoses. This could also potentially result in various 
strategies to obtain greater rewards. Fourth, the DRG system differentiates according to 
what phase of treatment a patient is. A multi-problem patient is, for example, more 
valuable to a hospital in the earlier phases of treatment, while reimbursement is lower in 
the later, recovery phases. This may lead to hospitals or different units within one 
hospital competing for patients. All these potential problems and «perversions» of such 
a financial–performance system need to be taken into account by the central political 
and administrative leadership and by the regional and local boards and their directors. 
We will ask whether this system lives up to its declared main goal of increasing 
efficiency without negatively affecting other goals, or whether it leads to jeopardy, 
negative impact or perverse effects (Hesse, Hood and Peters 2003). 
The hospita l  reform:  trust-based or  
performance-based management?  
In this section we will describe and analyze the effects and outcome of the hospital 
reform by focusing on internal administrative effects and external effects on users and 
patients. We will relate this to MBOR as a performance–management system and to the 
theoretical perspectives outlined. We will contrast two management models. The first is 
a trust-based model, informed by a combination of hierarchical control and traditional 
cultural elements, based on a high level of mutual trust and understanding between 
regional health enterprises and subordinate hospitals, but also between the local, 
regional and central levels in the health policy sector. This model envisages a high 
degree of decentralization and local autonomy. The intention is to let the managers 
manage and thus enhance cost-efficiency by giving them discretion in using allocated 
recourses. There is a well-developed system of dialogue, cooperation and informal 
networks and contact patterns. This model is more in line with the traditional 
Norwegian model of mutual cooperation and consensus but also contains unmistakable 
management elements.  
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The other model is a performance–management model, which is based to a greater 
extent on distrust. Hospitals and local enterprises pursue their own interests based on 
local rationality and institution-specific goals, which are not necessarily consistent with 
the goals of central government. The same goes for the regional health enterprises. They 
thus need to be controlled via formal contracts and management systems, monitoring 
and assessment arrangements. The idea is to make the managers manage by use of 
steering documents, formal steering dialogues, performance–management techniques 
and enterprise meetings. This model is more in line with the new official regulatory 
model of the OECD and with NPM reforms.  
Proceeding from the idea of political design and loyalty, we would expect the 
performance–management model to be better developed and have stronger effects at 
the regional level than at the local level. Seen from an institutional perspective we would 
expect the institutional tradition to enhance a trust-based system of government at the 
local level and the performance–management model to run into greater compatibility 
problems when confronted by the hospital culture. 
We distinguish between indicators of trust and cooperation, on the one hand, and 
indicators of formal performance–management techniques on the other hand. We ask 
to what extent executive leaders and board members of health enterprises agree with 
various statements about the relationship between health enterprises and other actors, 
using a scale from 1 to 5 (very much agree). The following assertions are used as 
indicators of management-based trust and cooperation: «There is a high level of trust 
between regional health enterprises and the Ministry of Health», «There is a high level of 
trust between local and regional health enterprises», «Cooperation between health 
enterprises in the region is good», «Regional health enterprises’ steering of local 
enterprises is characterized by dialogue and cooperation».  
To measure performance–management techniques we use the following assertions:  
«Performance accountability for health enterprises is clarified in a precise way in the 
contracts and steering documents between regional and local health enterprises», «The 
enterprise meeting and contracts give local health enterprises sufficient means for 
steering», «The health reform has improved the development of quality performance 
indicators», «It is difficult to distinguish between ‘steering dialogue’ and ‘staff dialogue’», 
and «The steering document from the owner is too detailed». 
The level of trust between the regional level and the central level is rather high (see 
Table 1 next page). Board members and executive leaders report that they have a high 
level of trust in the Ministry of Health, something that partly reflects the fact that 
regional board members have been recruited by the ministry. The table also shows quite 
a high level of trust between regional and local health enterprises, but a relatively lower 
level of cooperation. Fewer than half of the respondents agree that management 
relations between the regional and local levels are characterized by cooperation and 
dialogue. 
When it comes to the formal performance–management system almost 8 out of 10 
board members and executive leaders in the regional health enterprises say that the 
formal steering document from the ministry is too detailed. This practice runs counter 
to the reformers’ intention of steering at a distance by concentrating on general and 
strategic issues and leaving the details to the enterprises. In addition, quite a few 
WORKING PAPER 17 – 2004 PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
 16
respondents said it was difficult to separate the formal steering dialogue specified in the 
articles of association from the more informal areas of discussion, consultation and 
networks. Two out of three executives at the local level agree that performance 
accountability is clarified in the formal contract and steering documents. Despite this, 
fewer than half of the respondents report that the formal documents and procedures are 
sufficient to steer local health enterprises. And only slightly more that 50 per cent of the 
executives at the local level say that quality indicators have been developed to any great 
extent. In contrast, 81 per cent of executives at the regional level report the 
development of quality indicators.  
Table 1. Variables showing attitudes towards trust relations and performance–management models. 
Regional Health Enterprises (RHE) and Local Health Enterprises (LHE). Percentages. 
 RHE   
 
LHE 
 
Trust relations: 
Agree that there is a high level of trust between regional health enterprises and 
the Ministry of Health 
Agree that there is a high level of trust between local and regional health 
enterprises  
Agree that cooperation between health enterprises in the region is good 
*The steering of local health enterprises by regional health enterprises is 
characterized by dialogue and cooperation 
 
66  
 
63  
52 
- 
 
- 
 
60  
37  
43  
Performance management: 
It is difficult to separate the «steering dialogue» from the «staff dialogue» 
The steering document from the owner (the Ministry) is too detailed 
** Quality performance indicators have been developed to a great extent 
Agree that performance accountability for the health enterprises is clarified in a 
precise way in contracts and steering documents 
*Agree that there is sufficient steering of the health enterprises through the 
enterprise meeting and the contracts 
 
43  
79 
81  
- 
 
- 
 
- 
- 
54  
68  
 
47  
N (average) 56 248 
*This question was only put to local health managers (N=90), not board members 
**This question was only put to regional health managers (N=21), not board members 
There are high positive significant intra-correlations among the indicators on trust, 
cooperation and vertical dialogue (see Appendix Table 1A and Table 1B). For local 
executives there is an especially strong correlation between high mutual trust between 
the local and regional level and vertical steering based on dialogue and cooperation. 
Second, the trust, cooperation and dialogue variables do not vary in a significantly 
negative way with the formal performance system. On the contrary, there are some 
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significant positive correlations, indicating that the two sets of independent variables are 
more complementary than alternative. This indicates that there might not be a conflict 
between trust based and performance based management systems (Johnsen 2001). The 
paradox is however that on the one hand performance management systems build on 
assumptions of distrust between superior and subordinate agencies. But un the other 
hand a certain level of trust is necessary for making the performance management 
system work. Third, there are positive inter-correlations among the indicators for the 
formal performance system, but these are weaker than those for the trust/co-
operation/dialogue indicators. Fourth, the inter-correlations are generally stronger at the 
local level than at the regional level. 
E f f e c t s  o f  t h e  h o s p i t a l  r e f o r m  
The effect variables, reflecting the main goals behind the reform, are based on the 
following questions: «Based on your experience with the hospital reform, to what degree 
would you say there have been improvements in the following areas in your health 
region (health enterprise)?» The areas chosen for this paper are «More equality in the 
health service», «Shorter waiting lists/waiting time», «More user influence», «More 
closure, merger, and specialization of hospitals» «More efficient financial management», 
«More efficient personnel management» and «More professional and performance-based 
management». The first three categories are indicators of external effects and the last 
four of internal effects. For each of these categories the respondents were asked to 
evaluate the effects on a scale from 1 (very weak improvements) to 5 (very strong 
improvements). We also include a variable based on a question about overall evaluation 
of the reform so far: «All in all, how successful do you think the health reform has been 
so far?»  
First, the reform is evaluated as more successful by respondents at the regional level, 
than by those at the local level (Table 2). The same tendency is also obvious when the 
respondents are asked to evaluate specific areas. One way of interpreting this is that 
executives at the regional level are generally more loyal to the reform and identify more 
closely with it than local executives, who are more likely to represent the traditional 
hospital culture. Thus, there might be more wishful thinking, rhetoric and symbols at 
the regional level than at the local level, which is closer to the world of practice. 
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Table 2. Experience of effects of the hospital reform. Percentage of respondents who agree that there have 
been improvements in the following areas.1 Regional Health Enterprises (RHE) and Local Health 
Enterprises (LHE) 
 RHE LHE 
Evaluation of overall effect: 
So far the health reform has all in all been a success  
 
75 
 
52  
External effects: 
More equality 
Shorter waiting lists/waiting time 
Greater user influence 
 
33  
82  
45  
 
16 
69 
17 
Internal effects: 
Closure, merger and specialization of units  
More efficient financial management 
More efficient personnel management 
*More professional and performance-related management 
 
35  
86  
52  
76  
 
13  
61 
35  
58  
N= (average) 56 253 
* At the regional level this question was only asked to the health managers (N=21), not to the board 
members.  
Board members and executive managers of health enterprises have primarily 
experienced shorter waiting lists and waiting times for patients, improved financial 
management and generally more professional and performance-related management as 
an effect of the hospital reform. Few report more service equality or improvements in 
the functional specialization of hospitals. The improvements in personnel management 
are also less apparent than in other management areas. The results seem to indicate that, 
from the perspective of health enterprise leaders, some main goals of the reform have 
been largely fulfilled, while others are lagging behind. The change of organizational 
model seems to have had a greater impact on efficiency than on equality (Boyne et al. 
2003, Christensen 2003).  
E x p l a i n i n g  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  e f f e c t s  
The next question on which we focus is how the scores for trust relations and 
performance–management indicators relate to the indicators of external and internal 
effects. We first examine the bivariate correlation between each set of variables and the 
                                                 
1 Meaning respondents answering alternatives 4 and 5 on the question. 
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effect indicators and then do a multivariate analysis of the relative importance of the 
various independent variables for external and internal effects. 
Tables 2A and 2B in the Appendix show the bivariate correlations between the two 
sets of independent variables and the effects of the hospital reform. The main result is 
that there is a lot of consistency. Respondents scoring high on trust, cooperation and 
dialogue at the local and regional level see more positive external and internal effects 
than those who scored low on trust. What is more, the performance–management 
system affects perceptions of the effects of the hospital reform. Those who report that 
accountability has been clarified by contracts and steering documents and who believe 
that performance indicators have been developed to a great extent see more positive 
effects than the others. While trust relations have a significant effect both at the local 
and regional level, the performance–management system seems to have greater effects 
at the local level.  
The multivariate analyses mainly confirm the findings from the bivariate analysis 
(Tables 3 and 4). First, when we control for other variables, both trust relations and the 
performance–management system influence the variation in external and internal effects 
and implications of the hospital reform.  
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Table 3. Regional health enterprises. Summary of regression equation by effect indicators and 
cooperation/performance indicators. Standardized Beta Coefficients. Linear regression2 
External effects Internal effects   
Overall 
evalua-
tion of 
the 
reform 
Service 
equality 
Shorter 
waiting 
lists 
Greater 
user 
influence 
More 
closure, 
merger, 
speciali-
zation 
More efficient 
financial 
management 
More 
efficient 
personnel 
manage-
ment 
Trust:        
Trust RHE/Ministry .21*       
Trust RHE/ LHE .07 .29* .57*** .61*** .17 .19 .15 
Local cooperation .46*** .23 .09 -.10 .15 .21 .17 
Performance 
management: 
       
Too detailed 
steering document 
    .34***  .18 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R 
F-statistics 
Sign of F 
.56 
.32 
.48 
7.9 
.000 
.47 
.22 
.19 
7.3 
.002 
.63 
.40 
.37 
17.1 
.000 
.54 
.30 
.27 
10.2 
.000 
.48 
.23 
.19 
5.3 
.003 
.36 
.13 
.10 
.2.1 
.026 
.37 
.14 
.08 
2.5 
.070 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 level 
 Second, there are significant differences between the local and regional level. At the 
regional level the trust-related variables seem to be more important than the 
performance–management system variables when it comes to external and overall 
effects, while trust variables have no significant effect on the internal results of the 
reform. We observe that detailed steering documents seem to have an effect on closure, 
merger and functional specialization of hospitals. At the local level the importance of 
quality-performance indicators seems to have a significant effect on both external and 
internal effects, but so do trust relations between regional and local health enterprises. 
                                                 
2 Only variables that have a significant correlation in the bivariate analyses are included. More professional 
performance management is not included because of low N (21).  
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Table 4: Local health enterprises. Summary of regression equation by effect indicators and 
cooperation/performance indicators. Standardized Beta Coefficients. Linear regression3 
External effects Internal effects   
Overall 
evalu-
ation  
of the 
reform 
Service 
equality 
Shorter 
waiting 
lists 
Greater 
user 
influence 
More 
closure, 
merger, 
speciali-
zation 
More efficient 
financial 
management 
More 
efficient 
personnel 
manage-
ment 
More professi-
onal perfor-
mance mana-
gement 
Trust         
Trust  RHE/ LHE .29** .23** .16** .14** .28*** .22*** .02 .09 
Local coope-
ration 
.16** .09  .15** .12* .04 .08 .09 
Performance 
management 
        
Quality 
performance 
indicators  
.37*** .28*** .20*** .32*** .19*** .26*** .30*** .43*** 
Performance 
accountability 
clarified in 
steering 
documents 
.09 .02 .07 .00  .12* .08 .13** 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R 
F-statistics 
Sign. of F 
.61 
.38 
.37 
31 
.000 
.44 
.20 
.18 
11.7 
.000 
.31 
.10 
.09 
8.9 
.000 
.43 
.19 
.17 
11.5 
.000 
.42 
.18 
.17 
14,9 
.000 
.44 
.19 
.18 
.12.4 
.000 
.35 
.12 
.11 
7.1 
.000 
.53 
.28 
.26 
19.8 
.000 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 level 
The main finding from the analysis is that variations in external and internal effects of 
the hospital reform can be traced back both to trust relations and to the formal 
performance–management system. Well-developed quality performance indicators and a 
clarification of performance accountability by use of contracts and formal steering 
documents make a difference, but so do mutual trust relations and steering of local 
health enterprises by the regional level through dialogue and cooperation. We can also 
see that trust relations have a relatively stronger impact on external effects than on 
internal effects. At the regional level trust relations and local cooperation seem to be 
                                                 
3 Only variables that have a significant bivariate correlation are included in the table. Because of high inter-correlation 
between «Trust between RHE and LHE» and «Regional management based on dialogue and cooperation (R=.70) 
only one of the variables is included in the table. The variable «sufficient steering through enterprise meeting and 
contract» is excluded due to low N. 
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more important than the performance–management system, especially when it comes to 
external effects. 
When it comes to the more controversial issues of merging, closure and functional 
specialization of hospitals, detailed steering documents from the ministry seem to be 
important for executives at the regional level. The ministry has intervened in quite 
individual cases of closure and merger of local hospitals, emergency and maternity wards 
(Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2003). In 2002–2003 there were 13 extraordinary enterprise 
meetings, indicating a rather proactive and intervening ministry (Opedal 2004). 
Increased political salience, illustrated by a more active parliament (Opedal and 
Rommetvedt 2004) and the emergence of local lobby groups, makes it more difficult for 
the ministry to increase the autonomy of regional health enterprises. Thus, both the 
formal performance–management system and mutual trust relations between the 
regional and central level might come under pressure, resulting in a loose relationship 
between those features and perceived effects of the hospital reform. At the local level 
trust relations seem, however, to be important for comprehensive functional 
specialization. One lesson from this analysis seems to be that it is easier to see the 
positive implications of both the performance–management system and of the trust 
relations when focusing on the relationship between the local and regional level than 
between the regional and central level. This does not, however, exclude the possibility of 
cases at the local level that challenge both trust relations and the performance–
management system. This will be illustrated in the next section. 
The DRG-system and act iv i ty  based 
funding:  increased ef f ic iency or  
unintended consequences? 
The main focus of DRG use has been in resource allocation and pricing. In the 
Norwegian tax-funded health care system, where the financing and ownership of 
hospitals are public, the aim of using DRG financing is to improve the control of 
hospital productivity (Mikkola et al. 2002, Magnussen 1995). Since 1997 an increasing 
proportion of the grants from the central government to the counties (regional health 
enterprises from 2002) had been based on average DRG-based cost per in-patient 
treated, a tendency that is now being reversed.  
Several negative effects of the DRG system, such as «DRG-creep», patient selection 
and early discharge from hospital are well known (Mikkola et al. 2002, Donaldson and  
Magnussen 1992). DRG-creep means that patients are placed in higher-priced DRGs 
than their actual state of health would warrant. This is a well-known dysfunction of the 
system, which is vulnerable to attempts by hospitals to increase revenues by «creative» 
coding of patients (Modell 2004). Already in 1985 it was pointed out that the system 
offered opportunities for a systematic incorrect high coding of patients’ diagnoses in 
order to obtain maximum funding (Aas 1985). DRG creep can be of three different 
types (Hsia et al. 1988, Midttun et al. 2003). First mis-specification, meaning that the 
wrong diagnosis is applied or that the diagnosis does not fit the case report. Second, 
miscoding by reporting treatment or procedures that have not been conducted. Third, 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM WORKING PAPER 17 - 2004 
 23
re-sequencing − i.e., changing the sequence of diagnoses or reporting a secondary 
diagnosis as the main diagnosis in cases when this would result in higher 
reimbursement. As indicated earlier, DRG may lead to hospitals engaging in many 
intricate strategies to obtain more money from the government. 
Following the introduction of activity-based funding founded on the DRG system, 
both productivity and expenditure increased in Norwegian hospitals, resulting in severe 
budget-deficit problems. Waiting times have decreased, but there has also been a 
decrease in overall cost-efficiency, partly due to increased wages for physicians and 
nurses (Lian 2003). Activity-based funding is not very popular among clinic directors in 
hospitals. The DRG system has little legitimacy, due both to features of the system itself 
and to the practical problems of pricing individual cases. Moreover, a main critique is 
that central aspects of the hospital’s activities are not possible to quantify (Lian 2003). 
Another lesson from the DRG system combined with performance-based funding is 
that activities that do not yield a net income tend to be given low priority (NOU 
2003:1). This may result in patients with chronic diseases and «soft services,» such as 
research, habilitation, rehabilitation and psychiatry losing out in the competition for 
resources (Dalen, Grytten and Sørensen 2002). We will now illustrate the problems of 
introducing the DRG system and activity- and performance-based funding in Norway 
by focusing on a coding case in a specific health enterprise, on a performance audit by 
the Audit Office and on the reform of the funding system. 
T h e  c o d i n g  c a s e :  c r e a t i v e  c o d i n g  a n d  D R G -
c r e e p i n g .  
 In March 2003, a leading newspaper uncovered what was later labelled a coding scandal 
in a regional health enterprise (Aftenposten 12.3 03). The newspaper revealed that one 
clinic in a local health enterprise had registered more than 50 per cent of all patients in 
Norway as having undergone/needing tonsillectomies and as suffering from 
snoring/needing snoring operations. In this pilot project, a subordinate doctor 
proposed to the health enterprise a new «creative» way of coding, primarily by adding a 
secondary diagnosis to the primary. He posed as an external «consultant» and asked for 
a 10 per cent commission of the extra funding yielded by this practice. The managing 
director of the regional health enterprise and some local enterprises agreed to this idea, 
which brought each hospital extra funding to the tune of several million Norwegian 
kroner.  
When this scam was revealed, the minister mounted an investigation and the board 
of the regional health enterprise was instructed by the minister to react and report back. 
He also used an external auditing firm to investigate the case. Forty-eight per cent of the 
investigated coding was found to be false. The manager of the local health enterprise 
and the clinic manager involved resigned, and «supplementary» grants that the hospital 
had received illegally over the previous two to three years had to be paid back. The 
director of the regional health enterprise was severely criticized and stripped of many of 
his board chairmanships, and some months later he too resigned from the position, 
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partly because of the legitimacy problems arising from this case.4 The minister also 
replaced the executive board of the regional health enterprise. 
The coding case was investigated by the Audit Office, which criticized the 
Norwegian Board of Health for passivity and questioned its autonomy from the 
Ministry of Health as a regulatory agency. Generally it criticized both the government 
and the health enterprises for lacking sufficient control systems and routines. The 
standing committee on scrutiny in the Storting also handled the coding case and took a 
very critical view of the «creative» coding practice, which was seen as undermining trust 
both in the funding system and in public health care generally. The scrutiny committee 
asked for a comprehensive evaluation of the activity-based funding system and the 
Audit Office is now to do a performance audit of the DRG system, focusing on the 
coding of patient diagnoses. As a consequence of the coding case, the Ministry of 
Health is conducting a thorough evaluation of the activity-based funding system for 
Norwegian hospitals. The Board of Health has also opened a formal supervisory case 
against the local health enterprise that introduced the illegal coding practice. 
This case does not seem to be unique. The investigation by the Ministry of Health 
has indicated that upgrading of treatment is a widespread practice and brings hospitals 
higher reimbursements than a correct DRG coding would warrant. The report reveals 
discrepancies between the case record information and the reported DRG data in more 
than 40 per cent of the cases studied (Midttun et al. 2003). Three out of five hospitals 
practise some kind of «creative» coding to increase funding, such as adding secondary 
diagnoses or claiming reimbursement for treatment twice – both from the local hospital 
and from a specialist (Aftenposten 17.6 2003, Eilertsen 2003). Fourteen local health 
enterprises were suspected of «creative» coding and a total of 19 local health enterprises 
had to account for a significant bias towards diagnosis and treatment that yielded greater 
resources (Torjesen 2004). Partly as a result of this practice there was a significant 
increase in hospital expenditure between 2001 and 2002 but this might also to some 
extent be explained by the general hospital reform (Midttun et al. 2003). In contrast to a 
report from the Audit Office (Dokument 3:6 (2001–2002)), which indicated that until 
2000 «under-coding» was a greater problem than «over-coding», the new investigation 
indicated the opposite pattern for 2001 (Midttun et al. 2003). In 2004 a new report from 
the Audit Office examining 14 hospitals revealed that 27 per cent of the coded  
diagnoses were wrong  resulting in increased funding for 13 of the 14 hospitals. On 
average they had received 6 per cent more in such supplementary grants. If these 
hospitals are representative for all hospitals, the central government could have over-
funded the hospitals with 1.1 billions NOK due to this miscoding (Nettavisen 19.10 
2004). The Secretary General of the  Norwegian Medical Association explained the 
miscoding by lack of control from the Directorate of  Health and Social affairs and 
pressure from the hospital management on the medical doctors to set DRG codes with 
higher reimbursement. Some hospitals have their own controllers to overrule the 
medical doctors` coding practice (Dagsavisen 12.8 2004). 
                                                 
4 He also got into trouble for trying to «steal» patients from another regional health enterprise, using a former 
parliamentary representative to lobby against his own minister of health, and for creating legitimacy problems by 
paying himself (and his fellow leaders) high salaries and pensions. 
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An example of dysfunction in the DRG system is that the number of cases of 
surgery for snoring increased by more than 100 per cent between 1999 and 2003, mainly 
as a consequence of the very profitable reimbursements for this operation. For one local 
hospital, in particular, specializing in snoring operations became a very profitable 
business. The problem is that this kind of activity can reduce capacity for the treatment 
of other, more serious illnesses, such as cancer surgery or advanced ear surgery. 
Treatments that are complex, demanding and long-term may thus be given less priority 
(Gilman 2000), while treatment may be biased towards procedures with marginal costs 
that are lower than real treatment costs. This situation represents a major challenge to 
health care priorities (Kværnes 2004). As a consequence of the scam, the Ministry of 
Health in 2004 reduced the reimbursement for snoring operations to one third of the 
2003 tariff. 
T h e  p e r f o r m a n c e  a u d i t :  a r e  h o s p i t a l s  
g i v i n g  p r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  m o s t  p r o f i t a b l e  
p a t i e n t s ?    
In 2003 the Audit Office submitted a performance audit report to the parliament on 
efficiency in hospitals (Dokument no. 3:3 (2003–2004)). This took the form of a 
comparative study of the organization of hip surgery in 28 hospitals. This audit is so far 
the most systematic attempt to address causal relationships in a performance audit by 
the Audit Office (Stene and Karterud 2003). The report reveals significant differences in 
efficiency between the hospitals investigated and also a shift from less profitable to 
more profitable surgery. The hospitals tend to give preference to the most profitable 
patients and put economic criteria before medical criteria. This practice is seen as an 
unintended effect of the performance-based funding system. Moreover, its negative 
effect on the prioritizing of patients implies longer waiting times for some patients. 
When the performance-based funding system was introduced in 1997, the government 
launched it as a funding system, not as a prioritization system, although it was aware of 
the risk bias towards more remunerative patient groups. The minister even admitted 
when modifying the system that he had not believed the warnings at the time but had 
later realized that the system was potentially dysfunctional. The report from the Audit 
Office documented this trend for a particular group of patients, and the Storting asked 
the government to systematically evaluate whether the performance-based funding 
system affected hospitals’ patient priorities.  
T h e  f u n d i n g  s y s t e m :  a  r e t r e a t  t o  m o r e  
b l o c k  g r a n t s   
Since 1997 the Norwegian funding system for hospitals has been a mixed system of 
block grants from the state and activity-based funding. The proportion of DRG-based 
performance funding has increased from 30 per cent of total subsidies in 1997 to 60 per 
cent in 2003. In 2004 it was, however, decreased again, to 40 per cent, partly as a 
consequence of the negative impact of the DRG system (Innst. S. nr 82 (2003–2004). 
This was done in spite of a recommendation by a public commission that the use of 
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activity-based funding should be increased (NOU 2003:1). The government’s argument 
was that performance-based funding tended to stimulate productivity, while at the same 
time reducing control over health service priorities and over total health service 
spending. Performance-based funding tends to lead to the greatest expansion in areas 
where the hospital can get most income and not necessarily in the areas where the 
medical needs are greatest. The new system reduced waiting times but also produced 
overcapacity in some areas and a bias towards diseases that are easy to quantify and 
involve predictable costs at the expense of more serious, unpredictable and complex 
illnesses.  
One lesson is that even in public health care systems such as the Norwegian, DRG 
creep and a gradual deterioration in the validity of classification systems are potential 
problems that may arise when the DRG system is used as a basis for financing (Mikkola 
et al. 2002). In such a system appropriate professional conduct is important, since DRG 
decisions are made by individual doctors or small groups of them, and as such it is a 
rather autonomous system. The coding scandal could be taken as an illustration of how 
new management models might challenge the trust and legitimacy that traditionally have 
been vested in the medical profession (Torjesen and Gammelsæter 2004). When the 
system fails, as shown above, it becomes much more structured and controlled, 
restricting professional autonomy and making the funding system more technical and 
economic. For this reason many doctors prefer a block grant system based on objective 
criteria, which may increase their autonomy, or else a system based on real costs, but 
this is often seen as potentially rather bureaucratic.  
Discussion 
The survey data reveal that the hospital reform in Norway in practice is an integrated 
model, combining informal, trust-based approaches and formal performance-
management measures. The two management models do not represent alternatives to 
government strategy but rather supplement it. First, there is a rather high level of trust, 
dialogue and cooperation between executive leaders, both vertically between the 
ministry and the regional health enterprises and at the local and regional levels. Second, 
there are well-developed formal steering arrangements, consisting of detailed steering 
documents formulated as quasi-contracts. The majority of survey respondents agree that 
performance accountability for the health enterprises is clarified through these 
documents. In addition, a number of quality performance indicators have been 
developed. Third, in spite of this well developed formal system, the majority of 
executive leaders in health enterprises do not think the contracts and enterprise 
meetings represent sufficient mechanisms for steering the health enterprises. They are 
especially dissatisfied with the detailed steering by the ministry through the steering 
documents. In practice it is also difficult to separate the formal steering system from the 
more informal pattern of contacts and networks between executives at the regional and 
national levels. Fourth, executives at the regional level generally report more positive 
effects of the reform than their colleagues at the local level. Fifth, as a consequence of 
this mixed integrated system, variations in the perceived external and internal effects of 
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the reform can be traced back to both trust relations and to the formal performance–
management system. This is most obvious at the local level. At the regional level, trust 
seems to be more important than the performance–management system, especially 
when it comes to external effects. Other studies, including other independent variables, 
also reveal the importance of trust when the effects of the reform are evaluated. Besides 
these studies reveal that there are also substantial variations between different regions 
(Opedal and Stigen et al. 2003; Opedal and Stigen et al. 2004). Some regions lean more 
towards cooperation and mutual understanding anchored in the established tradition 
and culture, while others have been more assertive in introducing new steering 
techniques, such as purchaser-provider models (Hallingstad 2004). The last, more radical 
strategy produced a lot of conflicts and implementation problems, whereas the first 
more incremental approach was more easily adopted.   
 We argue that this balance between a formal performance–management system and 
an informal trust-based system can be understood from a broad institutional 
perspective, combining instrumental, cultural and environmental features. From an 
instrumental point of view, a central feature of the reform is the formal basis of the 
relationship between the owner (the central government) and the health enterprises as 
specified in the Health Enterprise Act, the articles of association, the steering 
documents, the performance–management system and the general enterprise meeting. 
In practice these documents and formal arenas of communication are combined with an 
informal trust-related network and contact pattern that can be traced back to the 
traditional culture of the Norwegian health sector and the general style of governance 
(Christensen and Peters 1999). If we take a cultural approach, we find a tendency 
towards «path dependency,» illustrated by a clear loyalty towards the owner. This loyalty 
may be interpreted as evidence of a traditional culture in the sector. Traditionally, there 
was a close relationship between health institutions as public entities and the counties as 
the former owners of the hospitals (Carlsen 1995, Martinussen and Paulsen 2003), and 
as a core element in the welfare state, the health sector has been the focus of much 
attention from central political executives. One might, therefore, argue that the culture 
favours political control more than autonomy, making it difficult for central executives 
to practice «hands off» management (Lægreid, Opedal and Stigen 2003). Mutual 
understanding, cooperation, a high level of trust and dialogue have been main features 
of the Norwegian political administrative culture and policy style in general, and the 
health care sector is no exception. The new formal steering system has not replaced this 
policy style but supplemented it, making governance relations more complex.  
Generally the performance management system seems to work best at the local level, 
which supports our previous finding that such systems work better the greater the 
distance from the political executive (Christensen and Lægreid 2002). The weak link of 
the system is on the interface between politics and administration. Performance 
measurement and performance management is becoming more and more common, but 
performance steering of agencies by political executives in ministry is not a common 
activity (Pollitt 2004). But even at subordinate level the system is vulnerable to the local 
culture and in practice we see the system adjusting to the trust relations and cooperative 
arrangements that already exist. In some cases the local culture may supplement and 
reinforce the performance–management system, but it can also undermine it, resulting 
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in negative side-effects and dysfunctioning of the kind indicated by the DRG case. What 
the DRG case might indicate is a cultural change from an integrated, collectivistic 
culture towards a more aggregative, individualistic culture (jf. March and Olsen 1989).  
The institutional environment represented by the NPM movement and its ideas of 
autonomization sets some limits on state ownership. Devolution and the granting of 
more power to the executive boards raises questions about how central governmental 
executives should engage with issues now formally under the jurisdiction of the health 
enterprises. It is now more generally accepted that NPM-related reforms are appropriate 
and good, and the current received wisdom about good management systems naturally 
also influences and constrains the hospital reform. The hospital reform is thus built on 
the assumption that the role of the owner should be restricted to formulating principles 
of management, and that he should not intervene and become involved in details, as 
often happened under county ownership. The new and more strategic role of the central 
executives, however, coincides with a strong traditional norm for political action, 
whereby solving concrete and immediate issues is a central task (jf. Aberbach and 
Rockman 2000).  
In Norway it has so far not been possible to draw firm conclusions about the effects 
of the activity-based funding system (Halsteinli et al. 2001, Kjekshus 2003). This study, 
however, indicates that the expectations of increased efficiency without negative side-
effects envisaged by the practitioner’s model will be difficult to live up to in practice. To 
understand what is going on in practice we have to supplement the managerial approach 
with contextual factors, which may help explain the dysfunctioning of the system. The 
analysis of the DRG system and activity-based funding reveal that performance 
assessment and increased output measurement in the public sector is likely to involve 
dysfunction. Until the end of the 1990s it was difficult to document unintended bias in 
prioritisation of patients (Lian 2003), but as we have illustrated in this paper the picture 
has changed in recent years. No matter how well intended performance management is, 
there are always unintended consequences (Lian 1994, van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). 
These include to stimulate strategic behaviour, damaging professionalism, increased 
monitoring costs, the emergence of a kind of «tunnel vision» brought about by 
emphasizing easily quantifiable aspects of performance, and sub-optimization, which 
implies reporting on only the most efficient parts of the organization (Smith 1995, De 
Bruijn 2002). 
Quantitative measurement tends to drive out qualitative measurement and the new 
performance–management system tends to result in increased bureaucratisation. Such 
flaws may reduce the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance system and there 
may be a weak correlation between performance indicators and actual performance. In 
our case this has to do with «perverse learning»: once organizations or individuals have 
learned which aspects of performance are measured, they can use that information to 
manipulate their assessments (Meyer and Gupta 1994, van Thiel and Leeuw 2002). Bad 
performance may be hidden or misrepresented, or distorted performance indicators 
might be used to over-report good performance, making the hospitals to appear more 
successful than they actually are. There may also be a problem of «skimming off the 
cream» − i.e., discriminating against implementing inefficient aspects of policies by 
providing services to those patients who make least expensive use of them, or favouring 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM WORKING PAPER 17 - 2004 
 29
patients who are most profitable, whereby the thresholds for treatment of the most 
profitable cases are set lower than a professional assessment would indicate. One aspect 
of such dysfunctioning is patient-shifting, whereby hospitals tend to avoid treating 
patients when the cost of treatment is above the average treatment cost. It is, however, 
contestable how extensive such «creaming» is. In Sweden, for example, these effects 
seem to be rather weak (Blomqvist and Rothstein 2000). 
Hood and Beaven (2004) have identified three kinds of health care managers. First, 
the «honest triers,» who share regulators’ objectives, do their best to meet the standards 
set and do not «game» when they fail; second, «reactive gamers,» who also share the 
objectives of the regulators, but try to game the system when they fail. This can be done 
by creative interpretation of coding rules, but also by data falsification in order to turn 
failures or bad performance into reported successes. Third, «rational maniacs,» who 
pursue goals thoroughly, at times illegally, often running counter to the intentions of the 
health care system, and who game the system in order to cover their tracks. The coding 
case might be seen as a case of «reactive gamers», although the introduction of illegal 
coding practices also suggests the existence of «rational maniacs». This seems to show 
that the practice of combining professional autonomy and discretionary reward systems 
may run into trouble when professionally appropriate behaviour, based on solid 
informal norms and path-dependency, is replaced by self-interested rational strategies 
that are «context-blind». Added to this, there is the potentially problematic role of 
managers in such systems. They may not necessarily confine themselves to passively 
complying with external pressure, but instead be more proactive and use various 
managerial tactics to develop and use organizational performance–management systems 
in biased ways (Modell 2004, DiMaggio 1988, Oliver 1991). 
The DRG case and the dysfunctioning of the funding system have revealed that it is 
necessary to separate rhetoric from reality. There are two main views on how to handle 
the problems of the DRG system (Eilertsen 2003). The first regards this as an 
implementation problem, attributable to lack of knowledge and experience, and it is 
argued that it can be solved through more education, training, control and a more 
sophisticated system. The second viewpoint sees creative coding as a logical 
consequence of the system itself. According to this viewpoint, the problem is more 
fundamental and associated with the underlying policy theory. The problems are 
inherent features of the system and thus represent an «anticipated scandal» (Fosse and 
Westin 2003). The DRG system has been dominated by a technocratic and mechanistic 
logic, but in practice it also has political implications (cf. Lonti and Gregory 2004).  
The assumption that the reform would enhance efficiency in the hospital system 
without negative side-effects has not been fulfilled in this case. We can see indications 
of eroding ethical capital and an administrative culture whose focus is shifting towards 
individual and organizational self-interest. Thus the administrative culture is under 
pressure to change, partly as a result of the reform, leading internal managers to adopt a 
more open attitude towards performance management; this in fact represents an over-
adaptation. Greater technical sophistication might not be enough to reduce dysfunction. 
If outcome and output are difficult to observe, which is often the case when classifying 
illnesses, treatment, surgery and individual health effects, then efforts to introduce more 
sophisticated and more precise methods of measuring output will probably be of little 
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help. The quest for greater specificity in output and performance measurement might be 
self-defeating if critical differences between tasks are not taken into account (Lonti and 
Gregory 2004). It is not only a question of using measurement to determine 
accountability; there is also a need for a more open dialogue between hospitals, 
managers, political executives, parliament and the general public. The accountability 
problem cannot be reduced to a kind of technical pathology but has to be seen in the 
wider context of political legitimacy and the ambiguity of mutual trust between citizens 
and political executives. One general lesson from introducing management by objective 
measures in the hospital sector is that neither an activity-based funding system nor a 
formal performance–management system provides a panacea for the problems of 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in this policy area. The hospitals are embedded in 
highly complex political, administrative and professional systems, and introducing 
private-sector steering techniques in such a setting is liable to produce unintended side 
effects. 
Conclusion 
This paper has focused on the mismatch between a strict performance–management 
doctrine and how it works in practice. Instead of describing and explaining the pattern 
using one dominant logic, we have advocated drawing a more complex picture of how 
health enterprises are organized, how they work and how they are transformed. A new 
performance management model based on NPM ideas has in recent years challenged 
the traditional Norwegian governance model. In practice we are now confronted with a 
mixed system, in which the traditional cooperative policy style is combined with new 
performance–management techniques and in which the political executive reserves the 
right to intervene when things go wrong or in politically sensitive cases (Christensen 
2003). To understand the relationship between performance management and public-
sector reform in practice, we have to look beyond one-factor explanations at the 
complex transformation processes going on. The reform process has been dominated 
by ideas about how health enterprises are supposed to behave according to an official 
idealised model, rather than by empirical documentation of how they actually work in 
practice. The formal management system seems to be rather broad, accommodating a 
variety of actual behaviour. Thus we must look behind the formal performance–
management model and examine «living» institutions.  
 What kind of balance exists between various public sector norms and values in a 
period of New Public Management reform? One position is that NPM, with its strong 
emphasis on efficiency, tends to undermine traditional public service values of fairness, 
predictability, honesty, equity, continuity, security, due process and political control 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). Generally NPM assumes that the culture of public 
service honesty is given, but at the same time performance–management techniques 
built on assumptions of distrust and self-interest may undermine the common culture 
and identity and create a shift towards a more individualist and egocentric culture. It is 
an open question whether there will be an erosion of the traditional values of fairness 
and honesty (Hood 1991), but there may well be an inherent latent corruption problem. 
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This is particularly a problem in public administrations where public service ethical 
capital was already low before performance–management techniques were introduced.  
Another more optimistic argument is that NPM supplements traditional values by 
introducing service quality and customer service and responsiveness and increased 
efficiency and that the tensions that occur are possible to solve. A third position is that 
NPM tends to increase tension between different values in certain specific contexts 
(Pollitt 2003). In arrangements such as DRG systems, performance–based funding of 
health care services, or in countries with weak ethical capital in the public sector and a 
low level of trust, the new mixture of values engendered by NPM reforms might be 
more challenging than in situations with clear boundaries between the public and private 
sectors, strong ethical capital in the public sector and a high level of mutual trust. It 
would, however, be naïve to expect NPM reforms, with their strong focus on efficiency 
and customer service, to be successfully adopted right across the public sector or in the 
public sector in all countries without any loss of other desirable values. Increased 
efficiency cannot be traded off against public trust. 
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Appendix:   
Table 1A. Regional health enterprises: Correlations between measures of trust and performance–
management systems. N= 56 (21) 
 Trust 
between 
RHE and 
Ministry of 
Health 
Trust 
between 
RHE and 
local HE 
Local 
coope-
ration 
 
Difficult to separate 
steering dialogue 
from staff dialogue 
Too detailed 
steering document 
from the Ministry of 
Health 
Quality per-
formance indi-
cators 
developed 
Trust between RHE 
and Ministry of 
Health  
- .10 .06 -.15 .05 -.39* 
Trust between RHE 
and LHE 
 - .61*** .01 .15 -.14 
Local cooperation   - -.02 .14 -.09 
Difficult to separate 
steering dialogue 
from staff dialogue 
   - .41*** .03 
Too detailed 
steering document 
from the Ministry of 
Health 
    - -.30 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 level
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Table 1B. Local health enterprises: Correlations between measures of trust and performance management systems. N= 254 (85) 
 Trust 
between 
RHE and 
local HE 
Local 
coope-
ration 
 
Regional 
management 
based on 
dialogue and 
cooperation 
 
Performance 
accountability clari-
fied in 
contracts/steering 
documents 
 
Sufficient 
steering through 
enterprise 
meetings and 
contracts 
Quality performance 
indicators developed 
 
Trust between RHE 
and LHE  
- .25*** .70*** .31*** .31*** .29*** 
Local cooperation  - .28*** .07 -.04 .12* 
Regional management 
based on dialogue and 
cooperation 
  - .36*** .20 .16 
Performance 
accountability clarified 
in contracts/ steering 
documents 
   - .27** .14** 
Sufficient steering 
through enterprise 
meetings and 
contracts 
    - .21* 
Quality performance 
indicators  developed 
     - 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 level 
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Table 2A. Regional Health Enterprises. Bivariate correlations between trust relations/performance systems and effect variables. Pearson r. N=56 (21) 
External effects: Internal effects:   
Overall 
evaluation of 
the reform Equal service 
quality 
Shorter waiting 
lists 
Greater user 
influence 
More closure, 
merger, 
specialization 
More efficient 
financial 
management 
More efficient 
personnel 
management 
 
More 
professional 
performance 
management 
Trust:         
Trust RHE/Ministry of Health .28** -.09 -.10 -.04 -.07 -.02 .14 
 
.21 
Trust  RHE/LHE .36*** .44*** .63*** .54*** .32** .32** .28** .29 
Local cooperation .51*** .42*** .45*** .29** .31** .33** .30** .57*** 
Performance management:         
Difficult to separate steering 
dialogue from staff dialogue 
-.15 -.03 -.14 .02 .22 -.03 .04 -.54** 
Too detailed steering 
document from the Ministry 
of Health 
.03 -.03 .15 .13 .39*** -.12 .23* .00 
Quality performance 
indicators developed 
.00 .26 -.08 -.06 -.08 .17 -.03 -.14 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 level
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Table 2B. Local health Enterprises Bivariate correlations between trust relations/performance systems and effect variables. Pearson r. N= 257 (82) 
External effects: Internal effects:   
Overall 
evaluation of 
the reform Equal service 
quality 
Shorter waiting 
lists 
Greater user 
influence 
More closure, 
merger, 
specialization 
More efficient 
financial 
management 
More efficient 
personnel 
management 
More professional 
performance 
management 
Trust:         
Trust  RHE/LHE .43*** .32*** .24*** .22*** .35*** .35*** .14** .26*** 
Local cooperation .28*** .19*** .08 .23*** .20*** .12* .16** .15** 
Regional management based 
on dialogue and cooperation  
.36*** .32*** .22** .32*** .29*** .19* .14 .27** 
Performance management:         
Quality performance 
indicators developed 
.43*** .33*** .26*** .34*** .30*** .36*** .28*** .48*** 
Performance accountability 
clarified in contracts/steering 
documents 
.23*** .15** .15** .13** .10 .25*** .12* .23*** 
Sufficient steering through 
enterprise meetings and 
contracts 
.20* .05 .09 .01 .19* .19* .13 .13 
***: significant on .01 level, **: significant on .05 level, *: significant on .10 le
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